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If anyone doubts the role of law in 21
st-
century conflicts, one need only pose 
the following question: what was the 
U.S. military’s most serious setback 
since 9/11? Few knowledgable experts would 
say anything other than the detainee abuse 
scandal known as “Abu Ghraib.” That this 
strategic military disaster did not involve 
force of arms, but rather centered on illegali-
ties, indicates how law has evolved to become 
a decisive element—and sometimes the deci-
sive element—of contemporary conflicts.
It is not hard to understand why. Senior 
commanders readily characterized Abu Ghraib 
in customary military terms as “clearly a defeat” 
because its effect is indistinguishable from that 
imposed by traditional military clashes. No one 
debates that the revelations energized the insur-
gency and profoundly undermined the ability 
of U.S. forces to accomplish their mission. 
The exploitation of the incident by adversaries 
allowed it to become the perfect effects-based, 
asymmetrical operation that continues to 
present difficulties for American forces. In 
early 2009, for instance, a senior Iraqi official 
conceded that the name “Abu Ghraib” still left a 
“bitter feeling inside Iraqis’ heart.”1
For international lawyers and others 
involved in national security matters, the 
transformational role of law is often captured 
under the aegis of the term lawfare. In fact, 
few concepts have risen more quickly to 
prominence than lawfare. As recently as 2001, 
there were only a handful of recorded uses of 
the term, and none were in today’s context. By 
2009, however, an Internet search produces 
nearly 60,000 hits. Unfortunately, lawfare has 
also generated its share of controversy.
Taliban and al Qaeda use lawfare tactics by manipulating 
unintended civilian casualties from airstrikes
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Law in Warfare
To the best of my knowledge, lawfare 
as used in today’s context first appeared in 
my 2001 essay for Harvard University’s Carr 
Center.2 At that time, the term was defined 
to mean “the use of law as a weapon of war” 
and, more specifically, to describe “a method 
of warfare where law is used as a means of 
realizing a military objective.” Today, the 
most refined definition is “the strategy of 
using—or misusing—law as a substitute for 
traditional military means to achieve an 
operational objective.”3
The purpose of the lawfare conceptu-
alization in the national security context is 
to provide a vehicle that resonates readily 
with nonlegal audiences, particularly in the 
Armed Forces. Historically, the role of law in 
armed conflict was variously presented, but 
often simply as yet another requirement, one 
to which adherence was a matter of integrity 
and moral rectitude. As powerful as such 
values may be as incentives, especially to the 
militaries of liberal democracies, conceiv-
ing of the role of law in more conventional 
military terms has its advantages. Under-
standing that the law can be wielded much 
like a weapon by either side in a belligerency 
is something to which a military member 
can relate. It facilitates accounting for law, 
and particularly the fact and perception of 
adherence to it, in the planning and conduct 
of operations.
While recognizing the ever-present 
ethical responsibility to comply with the 
law, how does transforming adherence to 
law into a strategy serve the purposes of the 
warfighter? The answer is found in the work 
of Carl von Clausewitz. A man of his times, 
Clausewitz had little regard for international 
law as a factor in war.4 Nevertheless, he was 
keenly aware of the political dimension, and 
this is the linkage to today’s understanding of 
lawfare.
Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is a 
“continuation of political intercourse, carried 
on with other means” relates directly to the 
theoretical basis of lawfare.5 Moreover, his 
analysis of the “trinity” of the people, govern-
ment, and military whose “balance” produces 
success in war is likewise instructive. Specifi-
cally, in modern democracies especially, main-
taining the balance that “political intercourse” 
requires depends largely upon adherence to 
law in fact and, importantly, perception.
Legal experts Michael Reisman and 
Chris Antoniou put it this way:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited 
armed conflict requires a substantial base of 
public support. That support can erode or even 
reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy 
the political objective, if people believe that 
the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhu-
mane, or iniquitous way.6
Some adversaries see opportunity in 
this aspect of our political culture. Professor 
William Eckhardt observes:
Knowing that our society so respects the rule 
of law that it demands compliance with it, our 
enemies carefully attack our military plans 
as illegal and immoral and our execution of 
those plans as contrary to the law of war. Our 
vulnerability here is what philosopher of war 
Carl von Clausewitz would term our “center of 
gravity.” 7
In short, by anchoring lawfare in 
Clausewitzean logic, military personnel—and 
especially commanders of the militaries of 
democracies—are able to recognize and inter-
nalize the importance of adherence to the rule 
of law as a practical and necessary element of 
mission accomplishment. They need not par-
ticularly embrace its philosophical, ethical, or 
moral foundations; they can be Machiavellian 
in their attitude toward law because adherence 
to it serves wholly pragmatic needs. Thus, 
the concept of lawfare aims to insinuate law 
into military thinking in a new way, one that 
ration alizes it in terms compatible with the 
realities of 21st-century operations.
Legal “Weaponry”
The new emphasis on law in war 
derives from the larger, worldwide legal rev-
olution. George Will recently characterized 
the United States as the “Litigation Nation” 
to describe how deeply legal consciousness 
has penetrated American society.8 Further-
more, international commerce depends 
upon law, along with a variety of interna-
tional forums, to operate efficiently. This, in 
turn, is accelerating a globalization of law. 
As international law generally penetrates 
modern life, it tends to influence, as other 
trends have, the way war is conducted. Add 
to that the enormous impact of informa-
tion mediums, from round-the-clock news 
sources to cell phone cameras that empower 
almost anyone to record events, and it is 
easy to understand why incidents that seem-
ingly implicate the international law of war 
can rapidly have significant ramifications 
among the body politic.
Commanders today, keenly aware of the 
devastating impact on operations that inci-
dents such as Abu Ghraib can have, typically 
are willing partners in efforts to ensure that 
compliance with the law is part and parcel of 
their activities. It is no surprise, for example, 
that the much-heralded counterinsurgency 
manual devotes a considerable amount of 
text to law and law-related considerations.9 
Counterinsurgency and other contemporary 
“irregular warfare” situations are especially 
sensitive to illegalities that can undermine 
the efforts to legitimize the government (and 
those wishing to assist it) that the insurgency 
is aiming to topple.
The new counterinsurgency doctrine 
also emphasizes that lawfare is more than 
just something adversaries seek to use against 
law-abiding societies; it is a resource that 
democratic militaries can—and should—
employ affirmatively. For example, the 
reestablishment of the rule of law is a well-
understood component of counterinsurgency 
and has proven an important part of the 
success U.S. forces have enjoyed in Iraq.10
There are other examples of how legal 
instruments can substitute for military means 
and function as an affirmative good. To 
illustrate: during the early stages of opera-
tions in Afghanistan, a legal “weapon”—a 
contract—was used to deny potentially valu-
able military information (derived from com-
mercially available satellite imagery) from 
hostile forces.11 In addition, although strate-
gists argue that 21st-century threats emerge 
most frequently from nonstate actors who 
often operate outside of the law, these actors 
are still vulnerable to its application. Legal 
“weaponry,” for instance, may well be the 
most effective means of attacking the finan-
cial networks terrorist organizations require 
to function. Likewise, sanctions and other 
legal methodologies can isolate insurgen-
cies from the external support many experts 
believe is essential to victory.
Clausewitz was keenly aware of war’s political dimension, and 
this is the linkage to today’s understanding of lawfare
36    JFQ / issue 54, 3 d quarter 2009 ndupress .ndu.edu
SPECIAL FEATURE  | Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts?
A tool for the enemy?
While the employment of legal method-
ologies can create offensive opportunities for 
savvy U.S. commanders, too frequently our 
opponents use an exploitative form of lawfare 
along the lines of that arising in Abu Ghraib’s 
aftermath. In fact, lawfare has emerged as the 
principal effects-based air defense methodol-
ogy employed by America’s adversaries today. 
Nowhere is this truer than in Afghanistan, 
where the Taliban and al Qaeda are proving 
themselves sophisticated and effective lawfare 
practitioners.
Specifically, the Taliban and al Qaeda 
are attempting to demonize the air weapon 
through the manipulation of the unintended 
civilian casualties airstrikes can produce. Their 
reason is obvious: precision air attacks are the 
most potent weapon they face. In June 2008, 
the Washington Times reported a Taliban 
fighter’s lament that “tanks and armor are not 
a big deal. The fighters are the killers. I can 
handle everything but the jet fighters.”12 More 
recently, Newsweek told of a Taliban com-
mander who, visiting the site of an attack by 
a Predator drone, marveled at how a “direct 
hit” was scored on the exact room an al Qaeda 
operative was using, leading the publication 
to conclude that a “barrage of pinpoint strikes 
may be unsettling al Qaeda.”13
Yet the enemy is fighting back by 
mounting a massive—and increasingly effec-
tive—lawfare campaign. Using the media, 
they seek to create the perception, especially 
among Afghanis, that the war is being waged 
in an “unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.”14 
Unfortunately, some well-intended efforts at 
countering the adversary’s lawfare blitz are 
proving counterproductive. For example, in 
June 2007, a North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) spokesman in Afghanistan 
insisted that the Alliance “would not fire 
on positions if it knew there were civilians 
nearby.”15 A little more than a year later, 
another NATO spokesman went even further, 
stating that if “there is the likelihood of even 
one civilian casualty, we will not strike, not 
even if we think Osama bin Laden is down 
there.”16 The law of war certainly does not 
require zero civilian casualties; rather, it only 
requires that they not be excessive in relation 
to the military advantage sought.
Regardless, NATO’s pronouncements 
unintentionally telegraphed an opportunity 
for lawfare-based strategy by which the 
enemy could avoid (or manipulate) airstrikes. 
That strategy is in effect today as evidenced 
by a November 2008 report wherein U.S. 
officers advised that the Taliban is “delib-
erately increasing the risk to civilians” by 
locating themselves among them.17 In terms 
of manipulation, consider an incident in 
which the Taliban, according to an American 
official, held a wedding party hostage as they 
fired on U.S. forces in an “attack designed to 
draw airstrikes on civilians and stoke anti-
American sentiment.”18
What is frustrating is the fact that revo-
lutionary advances in aerial surveillance tech-
nologies and precision munitions have made 
airstrikes, in the words of Marc Garlasco of 
Human Rights Watch, “probably the most 
discriminating weapon that exists.”19 The 
problem concerns perceptions. Accordingly, 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Secretary-General 
of NATO, correctly recognizes that percep-
tions are a “strategic battleground” and wants 
to “prioritize strategic communications” to 
remind the world “that the Taliban remain 
the ruthless killers and abusers of human 
rights that they have always been.”20
The Taliban is not the only adversary 
employing abusive lawfare tactics. In their air 
and ground operations in Gaza in late 2008 
and early 2009, the Israelis faced a foe who, 
according to Israeli officials, flouted inter-
national law in an unprecedented manner. 
Specifically, the New York Times reported:
Hamas rocket and weapons caches, including 
rocket launchers, have been discovered in and 
under mosques, schools and civilian homes, the 
[Israeli] army says. The Israeli intelligence chief, 
Yuval Diskin, in a report to the Israeli cabinet, 
said that the Gaza-based leadership of Hamas 
was in underground housing beneath the No. 2 
building of Shifa Hospital, the largest in Gaza.21
It appears that based on its experiences 
in the 2006 Lebanon War, the Israelis made 
careful and innovative counter-lawfare prepa-
rations for the Gaza operation. Besides using 
“meticulous technical and human intelligence” 
to validate targets—as well as employing low 
collateral damage munitions in strikes—the 
Israelis also subjected plans to review by 
military lawyers “huddling in war rooms.”22 
In addition, Israel “distributed hundreds of 
thousands of leaflets and used its intelligence 
on cell phone networks in Gaza to issue warn-
ings to civilians, including phone calls to some 
families in high-risk areas.”23
Perhaps of most interest is the imple-
mentation of a concept called “operational 
verification.”24 According to Defense News, 
almost every Israeli army unit has specially 
lawfare has emerged as 
the principal effects-based 
air defense methodology 
employed by America’s 
adversaries
Courtroom sketch of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and 
four other alleged September 11 co-conspirators
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trained teams equipped with video cameras, 
tape recorders, and other documentation 
gear. The aim is to “document the story in 
real time” while there is still a “chance to 
influence public opinion” about the conduct 
of the operation.
Anthony Cordesman argues that 
although he believes that Israel did not 
violate the law of war and made a “system-
atic effort to limit collateral damage,” there 
was nevertheless “almost constant negative 
coverage of Israel in the Arab and Islamic 
world, as well as in much of Europe,” despite 
Israel’s efforts.25 Consequently, as Der Spiegel 
reported, Israeli officials are “gearing up for 
a wave of lawsuits from around the world” 
claiming violations of the law of war.26 Other 
news agencies report that the Israeli govern-
ment is vowing to defend its soldiers against 
legal attack. Interestingly, Der Spiegel char-
acterized the expected legal action in what 
are in effect lawfare terms in paraphrased 
Clausewitzian language as a “continuation of 
the war with legal means.”27
operationalizing Law
What does all this mean for command-
ers in 21st-century conflicts? In the first 
place, it is imperative that warfighters reject 
interpretations of lawfare that cast the law as 
a villain. A better, more realistic assessment is 
set forth by attorney Nathanial Burney:
[Lawfare] is often misused by those who claim 
that there is too much law, and that the appli-
cation of law to military matters is a bad thing 
that hamstrings commanders in the field. The 
fact of the matter is that lawfare is out there; it 
happens. It is not inherently good or bad. . . .  
It might be wiser for such critics to take it 
into account, and use it effectively themselves, 
rather than wish it didn’t exist.28
Besides the fact that law may sometimes 
offer ways of bloodlessly achieving operational 
objectives, it is simply historically untrue that 
totalitarians who operate outside of humanitar-
ian norms that the law reflects are more likely 
to succeed. Scholar Victor Davis Hanson points 
out that the basis for the enormous success of 
Western militaries is their adherence to consti-
tutional government and respect for individual 
freedoms, and constant external audit and 
oversight of their strategy and tactics.29 Histo-
rian Caleb Carr goes a step further by insisting 
that the “strategy of terror” of waging war 
against civilians nearly always has proven to 
be a “spectacular” failure.30 In short, adherence 
to the rule of law does not present the military 
disadvantage so many assume.
Next, the commander must be con-
cerned with “legal preparation of the bat-
tlespace.” This means that command must 
ensure that troops have been properly trained 
to understand the law applicable to the opera-
tion and are ready to apply it under extreme 
stress. In this regard, the 2007 Department 
of Defense study of Soldiers and Marines 
in Iraq is troubling as it revealed that only 
“47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of 
Marines agreed that non-combatants should 
be treated with dignity and respect, and that 
well over a third of all soldiers and Marines 
reported that torture should be allowed to 
save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine.”31
Although intensive training and strong 
leadership may mitigate such attitudes, 
experts doubt such efforts can wholly prevent 
incidents from occurring.32 Furthermore, 
Stephen Ambrose observed that it is a “uni-
versal aspect of war” that when young troops 
are put “in a foreign country with weapons 
in their hands, sometimes terrible things 
happen that you wish had never happened.”33
This could suggest that the best way 
to avoid incidents is to limit the number of 
troops on the ground. Supporting this con-
clusion is a September 2008 report by Human 
Rights Watch that found that civilian casual-
ties “rarely occur during planned airstrikes 
on suspected Taliban targets” but rather 
“almost always occurred during the fluid, 
rapid-response strikes, often carried out in 
support of ground troops.”34 Thus, small-foot-
print operations can limit the risk to civilians, 
as well as limit the adversary’s opportunity 
for lawfare-exploitable events with strategic 
consequences.
Legal preparation of the battlespace also 
requires robust efforts to educate the media as 
to what the law does—and does not—require. 
Adversaries today are clever in their relations 
with the global media, and U.S. forces must be 
able to respond as quickly (and ideally before 
inquiries are made) and transparently as pos-
sible to lawfare-related incidents. Relationships 
with the media must be built in advance; once 
an incident occurs, it is difficult to explain 
legal complexities or to demonstrate the efforts 
to avoid unnecessary civilian losses on a time-
line that will be meaningful.
Commanders would be wise to emulate 
the Israeli initiative by establishing “operational 
verification” teams to record activity in real time 
in instances where the adversary is employ-
ing an effects-based lawfare strategy centered 
around allegations of war crimes. In any event, 
almost every Israeli army unit has specially trained teams 
equipped with video cameras, tape recorders, and other 
documentation gear
Marine combat photographer videotapes Marines conducting searches of Iraqi males
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multidisciplinary teams of legal, operational, 
intelligence, and public affairs specialists ought 
to be organized, trained, and equipped to 
rapidly investigate allegations of incidents of 
high collateral damage. Likewise, command 
and control systems ought to be evaluated for 
their ability to record data for the purpose of 
accurately reconstructing processes if required.
“Operational verification” teams could 
be more than simply sophisticated elements 
of an information operations effort. Properly 
organized, trained, and equipped, they can 
fulfill legitimate public diplomacy needs, 
but they can also provide near-real-time 
feedback to commanders as to how opera-
tions are being executed. Thus, commanders 
could rapidly adapt procedures if the empir-
ical data gathered by such teams indicate 
opportunities to better protect innocents.
Of course, the availability of expert legal 
advice is absolutely necessary in the age of 
lawfare. The military lawyers (judge advocates) 
responsible for providing advice for combat 
operations need schooling not only in the law, 
but also in the characteristics of the weapons 
to be used, as well as the strategies for their 
employment. Importantly, commanders must 
make it unequivocally clear to their forces that 
they intend to conduct operations in strict 
adherence to the law. Helping commanders do 
so is the job of the judge advocate.
Assuring troops of the legal and moral 
validity of their actions adds to combat 
power. In discussing the role of judge advo-
cates, Richard Schragger points out:
Instead of seeing law as a barrier to the exercise 
of the client’s power, [military lawyers] under-
stand the law as a prerequisite to the meaning-
ful exercise of power. . . . Law makes just wars 
possible by creating a well-defined legal space 
within which individual soldiers can act without 
resorting to their own personal moral codes.35
That said, commanders should aim 
not to have a judge advocate at the elbow of 
every rifleman, but rather to imbue troops 
with the right behaviors so they instinctively 
do the right thing on the battlefield. The 
most effective way is to carefully explain 
the enemy’s lawfare strategies and highlight 
the pragmatic, real-world impact of Abu 
Ghraib–type incidents on the overall success 
of the mission. One of the most powerful 
motivators of troop conduct is the desire 
to enhance the security of fellow soldiers. 
Making the connection between adherence 
to law and troop safety is a critical leader-
ship task.
Integral to defensive lawfare operations 
is the education of the host nation population 
and, in effect, the enemy themselves. In many 
21st-century battlespaces, these audiences 
are not receptive to what may appear as law 
imposed by the West. In 1999, for example, a 
Chinese colonel famously argued that China 
was “a weak country, so do we need to fight 
according to your rules? No. War has rules, 
but those rules are set by the West. . . . [I]f 
you use those rules, then weak countries have 
no chance.”36
To counter such beliefs, it is an essential 
lawfare technique to look for touchstones 
within the culture of the target audience. For 
example, in the early 1990s, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross produced an 
illustrated paperback that matched key provi-
sions of the Geneva Convention “with bits of 
traditional Arab and Islamic wisdom.”37 Such 
innovations ought to be reexamined, along 
with creative ideas that would get the messages 
to the target audience. One way might be to 
provide audio cassettes in local languages that 
espouse what are really Geneva Convention 
values in a context and manner that fit with 
community religious and cultural imperatives.
The point is to delegitimize the enemy 
in the eyes of the host nation populace. 
This is most effectively accomplished when 
respected indigenous authorities lead the 
effort. Consider Thomas Friedman’s favor-
able assessment of the condemnation by 
Indian Muslim leaders of the November 2008 
Mumbai attacks:
The only effective way to stop [terrorism] is for 
“the village”—the Muslim community itself—
to say “no more.” When a culture and a faith 
community delegitimize this kind of behavior, 
openly, loudly and consistently, it is more impor-
tant than metal detectors or extra police.38
Moreover, it should not be forgotten 
that much of the success in suppressing 
violence in Iraq was achieved when Sunnis in 
Anbar Province and other areas realized that 
al Qaeda operatives were acting contrary to 
Iraqi, and indeed Islamic, sensibilities, values, 
and law. It also may be possible to use educa-
tional techniques to change the attitudes of 
enemy fighters as well.
Finally, some critics believe that 
“lawfare” is a code to condemn anyone who 
attempts to use the courts to resolve national 
security issues. For example, lawyer-turned-
journalist Scott Horton charged in the July 
2007 issue of Harper’s Magazine that “lawfare 
theorists” reason that lawyers who present 
war-related claims in court “might as well 
be terrorists themselves.”39 Though there are 
those who object to the way the courts have 
been used by some litigants,40 it is legally and 
morally wrong to paint anyone legitimately 
using legal processes as the “enemy.”
commanders must make it 
unequivocally clear to their 
forces that they intend to 
conduct operations in strict 
adherence to the law
BG Michael A. Ryan, U.S. Forces 
Afghanistan, offers condolences 
to families of those killed during 
an operation targeting insurgents, 
February 2009
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Indeed, the courageous use of the courts 
on behalf of unpopular clients, along with the 
insistence that even our vilest enemies must 
be afforded due process of law, is a deeply 
embedded American value, and the kind of 
principle the Armed Forces exist to preserve. 
To be clear, recourse to the courts and other 
legal processes is to be encouraged; if there are 
abuses, the courts are well equipped to deal 
with them. It is always better to wage legal 
battles, however vicious, than it is to fight 
battles with the lives of young Americans.
Lawfare has become such an indel-
ible feature of 21st-century conflicts that 
commanders dismiss it at their peril. Key 
leaders recognize this evolution. General 
James Jones, USMC (Ret.), the Nation’s new 
National Security Advisor, observed several 
years ago that the nature of war has changed. 
“It’s become very legalistic and very complex,” 
he said, adding that now “you have to have 
a lawyer or a dozen.”41 Lawfare, of course, is 
about more than lawyers; it is about the rule 
of law and its relation to war.
While it is true, as Professor Eckhardt 
maintains, that adherence to the rule of law 
is a “center of gravity” for democratic societ-
ies such as ours—and certainly there are 
those who will try to turn that virtue into a 
vulnerability—we still can never forget that it 
is also a vital source of our great strength as a 
nation.42 We can—and must—meet the chal-
lenge of lawfare as effectively and aggressively 
as we have met every other issue critical to 
our national security.  JFQ
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